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Abstract
Political thought has long nurtured three fears about armed forces: that the people will 
make war on each other; that the government will make war on the people; and that the 
soldiers will make war on government. The democratic tradition has typical responses to 
these fears, among others by commercialising society; limiting and weakening the state 
empowering the legislature; encouraging professionalism; and punishing partisanship. 
When viewed from a behavioural or practical angle, many of these responses are 
deeply flawed.
Introduction
What does a democracy expect of its armed forces1 at home? Some would say 
that satisfactory answers to this question have already been given by civil-military 
relations scholars such as Cottey, Edmunds and Foster (2002); Huntington (1957, 
especially pages 80 to 97) and Kohn (1997), as well as democratic peace-theorists to 
the likes of Brown, Lynn-Jones and Miller (1999). Theoreticians of Security Sector 
Reform, such as Fayemi and Ball (2004), and the principles developed by the UK’s 
1 Consisting of military bodies specialising in maximum force; police forces that include 
maximum force components, often housed in paramilitary units; and intelligence services, 
operating independently of military and police bodies, and whose activities include covert 
action which includes the use of maximum force.
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Department for International Development (n.d.) have contributed as well. And 
true, the existing answers are powerful, especially those given by Huntington. Yet, 
there are also persistent weaknesses.
First is the relative indifference to armed forces other than the military. One such 
armed force is autonomous intelligence force(s). Stepan, for example, has insisted 
that autonomous intelligence organisations are critical to democratisation in the 
Southern Cone and that the intelligence forces’ often covert use of armed force 
makes them a problem equal to that of the military (Stepan, 1988). Another armed 
force is paramilitary or militarised police forces. These are found even among older 
democracies, France for example, but also in younger democracies such as Portugal 
and Spain.
Second is the reification of methods and techniques such as the formulas of Security 
Sector Reform: the legislature must control declarations of war and the military 
budget; the military must be professional; civil society has watchdog duties; etc. 
By turning methods into ends-in-themselves, advocates avoid the question whether 
a method really works in the presumed manner. ‘Oughts’ may have nothing to do 
with actual behaviour. And what should be done in situations where the requisite 
institutions are either absent or feeble?
Third, it is impossible to escape the impression that the existing scholarship’s 
understanding of democracy is thoroughly anglophilic. Whereas American and 
English notions of democracy drew on the historical fight to limit monarchical 
power, the French experience, for example, can be understood as emboldening 
the state. The French Revolution’s legacy soaks democracy in the heady waters of 
societal transformation. After 1789, the state’s power provided the leverage for 
massive changes in the French economy and society.2
The French Revolution was, in large part, informed by the ideas of Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau about the general will, a notion that asserted the popular will was a moral 
entity that consisted of more than the sum of its parts. French revolutionaries 
directed “the nation as though it were no longer composed of a multitude but 
actually formed one person … it was the theoretical substitute for the sovereign will 
of an absolute monarch” (Arendt 1965:156). Although the nation was indivisible, 
the Revolution’s politicians were divided, thus making France vulnerable to invasion. 
Eventually Napoleon came to the rescue. This story was to end at Waterloo, but 
in the process Bonapartism was born: The French military were the guardians of 
the general will created by the Revolution, and thus have the right and duty to 
guard against betrayals of France by civilian politicians and bureaucrats. Soldiers 
have the right to disrupt political authority because the “Army takes responsibility 
for the People” (Horne 1984:92; see also Arendt 1965:163-183, 190-191; 
De la Gorce 1963).
2 My interpretation is based on Furet (1981) and Skocpol (1979).
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French soldiers have not been reluctant to claim the role once played by the absolute 
monarch.3 And the French have not kept Bonapartism and the social revolution to 
themselves. Mamdani, for example, has shown how the Rwandan state, after the social 
revolution of 1959 started to define the military as a nation-in-uniform, defined the 
nation as an indivisible entity, and dedicated the state to completing the revolution 
started with the uprising against colonial masters. These notions smoothed the road 
to mass participation in state-organised killing designed to rid the Rwandan nation 
of any trace of political pluralism (Mamdani 2001:103-131, 184-233).
In the post-1970 era of democratisation, understandings of democracy have shied 
away from the ambitions of the French and the Anglophone love of freedom and 
liberty. Minimalist understandings of democracy are currently much in favour, 
described by Shapiro as a system of managing conflict by means of procedures 
and rules. Beliefs, preferences and values are left intact (Shapiro 2003:10-34). The 
pioneer of this school is Joseph Schumpeter (1942), although Isaiah Berlin follows 
the same line (Berlin 1992:10-13), as do Conflict Management-scholars such as 
John Paul Lederach. North American Conflict Management-scholars tend to 
believe in managing diversity so that it does not escalate into violence. A negative 
peace or the absence of war is triumph enough (Lederach 1997).
The understanding of democracy as the absence of war is quite popular among 
democratising African countries, especially those of Africa’s southern regions. 
Here countries have embraced democracy after devastating experiences of war. 
During the war, elites came to understand they were caught in “hurting stalemates” 
(Zartman  1989), and then embraced democratic ideas and procedures because 
they offered a way to end the war. Constitutional democracy and proportional 
representation, for example, ensured that outvoted and vulnerable (but spoiling and 
potentially violent) groups could be accommodated (see Bratton 1999; Bratton & 
Van de Walle 1997). This type of democracy and democratisation has its critics: it is 
said to be elitist, superficial, and top-down. This criticism is not entirely fair as high 
voter turnout (when outcomes are not in doubt) and other bottom-up indicators 
suggest that people in these types of African democracies are deeply committed to 
making democracy work. People behave around democratic procedures as if their 
very lives depended on it, as it probably does (Little & Logan 2009; Logan & 
Machado 2002).
Acknowledging different meanings of democracy is not to dilute the conception. By 
democracy we refer to a system with universal franchise, genuine and regularly-held 
elections, and accountable governance. Democracies may vary in, for example, their 
executive systems, voting systems, and legislative structures; yet variation should not 
disguise the central purpose of a democracy, which is to serve individuals, collections 
of individuals, and/or communities (Dahl 1956:1). We use the term ‘democratic 
3 It challenged the leaders during the Franco-Prussian War; senior soldiers fought with 
Clemenceau because he was too radical for their taste; De Gaulle disobeyed a legally 
elected Petain; the Algerian coup-makers challenged De Gaulle; and so on to the rift with 
Mitterrand over his communism. It is only with the Fifth Republic (post-1958) that a more 
confident civilian control over the military has been established. See Martin (1981).
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tradition’ to refer to these necessary components but the term also includes other 
components of democracy that have developed over centuries in different contexts.
Armed forces, however, do not always fit in comfortably with the democratic 
tradition. Political thinkers have long nurtured three fears about armed forces: that 
the people will make war on each other; that the government will make war on the 
people; and that the soldiers will make war on government. The purpose of this 
article is to (a) identify and explain these fears and (b) to discuss the typical means 
by which the democratic tradition has responded to these fears.
The fear of a warlike culture and society
Theorists argue that economic, cultural and social (that is, societal) conditions can 
make or break democratic government. Much of the recent writing in the so-called 
Third Wave of democratisation has framed this argument as being about either 
the preconditions of democracy or conditions affecting the consolidation of new 
democracies. If a societal foundation remains weak, democratic governance will not 
survive (see, for example, Huntington 1991; Putnam 1993).
For our purposes, one societal condition is important: a warlike or militarised culture 
and society.4 However, how do we recognise a militarised culture and society? What 
are its causes? And cures? A militarised culture and society can derive from minority 
rule, the fear of insecurity or because a democratic society loses its commitment to 
democratic values. The cure has traditionally been economic in nature. When it is 
not found, the people of a militarised society will always be “either at your throat 
or at your feet”.5
One of the earliest descriptions of a militarised society is Thucydides’s description 
of Sparta in The Peloponnesian Wars: Spartans are calculating even when they 
do the right thing; ungenerous and deceitful in their dealing with others; 
xenophobic; they think education should cultivate military spiritedness; and 
believe individual initiative and talent had to be sacrificed to the greater good 
(Thucydides  1972:142-144, 161-164). Sparta’s slave population was large and 
because of limited assimilation into Spartan society, also restless. A love of freedom, 
equality and commerce was going to be of no help in war, and worse, quelling a 
slave revolt during war. Therefore Spartans required of themselves to love discipline, 
hierarchy and inequality: they needed to produce warriors.
4 The term culture will here refer to beliefs and ideas about what is fitting and proper for human 
beings to do in one context. Beliefs and ideas are abstract but they also can be materialised in art, 
entertainment, letters, and practices. The term society here refers to more than a collection of 
individuals but also to societal formations such as families, ascriptive and associational groups, 
classes, communities and regions. Neither culture nor society is static; change is permanently in 
motion but it is rarely dramatic or sudden.
5 Said by Churchill of Germans but also commonly cited as an “old European” saying. See 
Germany: Cops and robbers (1945) and Germany: Last call for Europe, 1950.
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Although Athens was not a democracy, as we would understand the term,6 
Thucydides’s description of the Athenian manner is meant to illustrate democratic 
attitudes and behaviour. The Athenian manner is “daring, permissiveness … [and 
shows] generosity without pettiness and calculation, freedom, generous gaiety 
and ease, courage in war which stems not from compulsion, dictation, and harsh 
discipline” (Thucydides 1972:142-151). Athenians are energetic, individualistic, 
self-assured risk-takers, tolerant of differences, and welcome foreigners because they 
would like to trade with them.
Hobbes thought warlike behaviour flowed from a naturally equal human condition. 
For Hobbes, human beings had equal capacity to kill each other and because of that 
capacity, were equal. Our equality – the sameness of our human desires and fears – 
makes us fight others, and fighting requires both force and fraud. With the human 
character dominated by the love of force and fraud, life is grim: “No arts … no letters, 
no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and 
the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1977:98-99).
An escape out of the warlike condition is possible and lies in giving up a portion 
of freedom in exchange for gaining protection from violence. But yet once again, 
how does this escape come about? Hobbes thought it happened when a sovereign 
or power beyond our ordinary, fearful selves emerged with the capacity to overawe 
us and provided us with a life free from the fear of an early death. We are therefore 
obliged to subordinate ourselves to the creator of that order and safety, the sovereign. 
Yet regression into a condition of war and/or the resurgence of force and fraud are 
always possible. We fear such a return to war, something that the leviathan can of 
course exploit (Hobbes 1977:80-112; 166-167).
De Tocqueville is no more convinced that a democratic society will always remain 
democratic: a regression is possible when “the laxity of democratic mores combined 
with the restless spirit of the army” (De Tocqueville 1969:735). Regression results 
in, among others, societal militarisation. Military things become an ideal that all 
society should imitate. Hierarchy is ranked higher than equality; force higher 
than consent; and discipline and order higher than freedom: “… the people would 
become a reflection of the army, and societies would be regimented like barracks” 
(De Tocqueville 1969:735).
The list of cases illustrating cultural and societal militarism is unfortunately not a 
short one. Besides Latin American political cultures, a popular citation is the case 
of Germany, not least because German militarism was connected to frequent wars 
against its neighbours and because of the horrors of the Nazi era (Calleo 1978:1; see 
also An 2006; Larres 2002).
6 In Athens power was not in the hands of a minority but the majority and, although Athenians 
owned slaves, the slave population was small and relatively well-integrated into society.
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The commercial cure
How do democrats act on the fear of a militarised culture and society? Since the days 
of the Peloponnesian wars, the major corrective has been seen to lie in commerce. 
Hirschman (1977:4) explains how early capitalist thinkers addressed the twin 
problems presented by warrior ideals and military elites devoted to seeking glory.
The love of glory was challenged on the grounds that it lacked realism about human 
nature. A more realistic interpretation, a host of capitalist theorists argued, was an 
individual motivated by interests, not glory, and the dominant interest was avarice, 
action in accordance with your economic interests, and/or the love of profit. This 
“acquisitive drive” would result in commerce, banking and industry. Commerce 
would make the ways of men gentler and more polite because commercially-minded 
people realise they need others. Barbarian ways would be polished and softened.7
The early capitalist thinkers did not expect the glory-loving elite to disappear; it 
would be counteracted, however, by the rise of a “middle rank of men”, an elite 
based in trade and industry (Hirschman 1977:82-83). Of course this middle rank 
of men presupposed the institution of private property. Locke told how labour 
would privatise nature’s bounty (Locke 1952:16-30). For De Tocqueville, too, the 
devotion to property was important. He adds:
The ever-increasing number of men of property devoted to peace, the growth 
of personal property which war so rapidly devours, mildness of mores, 
gentleness of heart, that inclination to pity which equality inspires, that cold 
and calculating spirit which leaves little room for sensitivity to the poetic and 
violent emotions of wartime – all these causes act together to damp down 
warlike fervour, among civilized nations warlike passions become rarer and less 
active as social conditions get nearer to equality. (De Tocqueville 1969:646)
While the majority of the early capitalist thinkers were at pains to show that 
the acquisitive drive was somehow natural, later thinkers started to think more 
historically about human motivations. What historical conditions or factors will 
thus foster or cultivate a commercial temperament? Religion is one condition or 
exposure deemed to foster a commercial disposition.
The answer was that a conversion to Protestantism stimulated capitalist thinking 
and behaviour. Protestant thinking differentiated itself from Catholic thinking 
by arguing that an individual could have a relationship with God without the 
intervention of the Roman Catholic Church. Another major differentiation from 
the Catholic thinking was the stress on human activism and energy in this life on 
earth. No longer accepting of the quietude that flowed from arguing that the City 
of Man was inferior to the City of God, Protestant thinking argued that the purpose 
of the individual in this life was to show devotion by cultivating God’s creation. 
Christians should work and work hard, and they deserved to own the fruits of their 
labour. They were not supposed to flaunt their wealth or become materialistic. The 




material plenty that was produced, testified to the great- and goodness of God. One 
should approach the fruits of one’s labour in the spirit of asceticism, piety, and self-
denial – not pride and vanity (Weber, Parsons & Tawney 2002).
Can the commercial path be taken by every country and community? To the writers 
of The Federalist Papers, the answer was ‘no’ and the reason was more complicated 
than not being a Protestant. James Madison envisioned a dynamic societal base for 
democracy: since money was constantly being made and lost, classes and groups 
would never consist of the same members. Dynamic commerce and industry required 
an “extensive republic” or wide swaths of territory with abundant natural assets. 
Such commercial and class mobility was unlikely to occur in small, agriculturally-
based countries (The Federalist Papers 1961:77-84; see also Smith 2003).
By the nineteenth century, the reasoning that militarism flourishes when there is 
not enough commercial dynamism, started to fray. One critic was Lenin. Too much 
capitalism, he said, would produce militarism or, more precisely, finances from 
capitalism’s workings would produce a surplus that had to be got rid of, among 
others by spending on military things, foreign military adventures, militarism, and 
war-mongering (Lenin 1971). Lenin was undoubtedly influenced by the arms race 
between Britain and Germany and it is the same combination of military build-up 
and economic growth that prompted later critics within the democratic tradition 
to sustain the argument. These critics used the concepts of a “garrison state” or a 
“military-industrial complex” to capture the essential failure of the highly developed 
capitalist cure (Lasswell 1941; Mills 1956).
One of the problems of this line of reasoning is that it focuses too heavily on the 
state and state-driven militarism (see Berghahn 1981). That the state or government 
can cultivate, even demand, militarism in society, is historically obvious. Yet culture 
and society may be militarised without the state requiring and/or stimulating it.
The fear that government makes war on the people
Here the fear is that government will seek foreknowledge of war by spying on 
people; will arrest and detain people in preparation of the killing; and will then kill 
people. Democratic scholars are divided about why armed forces and politicians 
make common cause of their attack on people and how one addresses the problem:
Some scholars believe the faults will be the creation of the elite, party or person who 
monopolises power (Dahl 1989:49, 348 [fn 8]). Their solution to this problem is 
to limit the power of the state and to require of the state to obtain the consent of 
the governed for their actions. Government is only allowed to perform a narrow 
range of functions, thus limiting the reach of political rulers.8 Another group of 
scholars, described as representing a republican tradition,9 believe the problem does 
not derive from who holds power in government; the fault lies in the very nature of 
government power, which tends to become more concentrated.
8 For full explanations of the logic, see Locke and Nozick (1974).
9 From Pocock (1975).
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But how does the democratic tradition act on this fear? I mention only three 
avenues of action: limiting and weakening state power, an instrument of the people 
and a civilianised military.
Limiting and weakening state power
One form of limiting state power consists of reducing the range of state functions 
or responsibilities. Functions are still supposed to be properly performed but these 
functions are few (De Tocqueville 1969:690-695). Another form of limiting state 
power is the separation of powers (SOP) or, more accurately, the sharing of powers 
by separate institutions, which will stimulate competition among institutions, and 
thus keep the state divided against itself. Because humans are by nature jealous, the 
inhabitants of any branch will guard its own powers while envying those of the 
other branches. By encouraging “ambition to counteract ambition” (The Federalist 
Papers 1961:322) it is impossible for any party or person to dominate the state (The 
Federalist Papers 1961:320-325).
Contemporary democratic thinking extends the idea of limiting and weakening 
state power to the political marketplace. Politicians’ competition for votes, 
for example, stimulates political participation, which can check the power of 
incumbents. Politicians’ need to market themselves discourages politicians from 
behaving like pigs and rascals. And voters need to be provided with alternatives 
about which political product to buy. The contemporary division of power, in other 
words, needs a good deal of political participation and a strong opposition (see 
Schumpeter 1942).
One criticism of the SOP is that the powers given to the legislatures and judiciary (to 
implement SOP) are superficial; it is really the executive who rules the roost. Judges 
and lawmakers do not have the power to leave a mark on substantial issues about the 
armed forces, such as their deployment, behaviour and interrogation. Lawmakers 
monitor action, for example, in asking for reports, because they want to see whether 
the executive has in fact done what they promised to do. Of course lawmakers do try 
to influence the executive, but the oversight function usually contains precious little 
power to act or to make policy.10 The accountability function of lawmakers implies 
greater activism as a legislature is, as such, able to forbid, sanction, insist that the 
executive answer questions, etc. But still, many, if not the majority of, substantive 
issues remain beyond reach. When the courts review matters, they tend to review 
whether standards have been correctly applied in principally two areas: staffing 
issues and military discipline, while avoiding questions of whether, for example, 
foreign bases are allowed or issues concerning interrogation (Murray & Stacey n.d.).
A second criticism is that, while the diversified authority of the SOP looks impressive 
from the top-down, from the bottom-up one can only see contradictory demands. 
The executive will demand efficiency from its soldiers but the judiciary wants, 
increasingly and even on the battlefield, constitutionality and legality. The executive 
10 The American legislature is an exception to this generalisation: Congressional committees have 
a great deal of policy-making power.
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insists that its spies maintain strict standards of secrecy, but the legislature, political 
society, and the public want transparency (see Lustgarten & Leigh 1994). These 
contradictory demands bring confusion, paralysis and, most of all, inefficiency. In 
many areas of policy, some measure of the inefficiency produced by democracy is 
tolerable. But when divided state power is at the core of events such as 9/11, or seen 
to be at the core, the tolerance dwindles.
A third criticism is that the executive dominates particularly the legislature because 
of legislative weakness or executive imperialism or because of both. In practice 
the legislature of an established democracy such as the USA, for example, may 
control legal declarations of war, but the use of force is firmly in the hands of the 
executive. Until 1999, the United States had been involved in five declared wars, 
one civil war, three undeclared wars (Korea, Vietnam, and the 1990 Gulf War) – as 
well as 244 lesser international military operations driven by the executive branch 
(Noonan 1999:1-2; Grimmett 1999).
But the story of executive dominance is more complicated than imperial personalities 
and incompetent, foolish or timid legislatures. Executive branches have benefitted 
from structural shifts in power.
In the nineteenth century, democratic thinking successfully argued that the 
military was an instrument of the legislature. Clausewitz, for example, expresses 
the relationship as war being a “continuation of policy by others means”. How 
so? War, Clausewitz thought, contained a “remarkable trinity”: “the people”, “the 
commander and his army”, and the “government”, with the legislature declaring war, 
the commander and his army conducting operations, and the people supporting the 
war effort (Von Clausewitz 1976; see also Aron 1983; De Nooy 1997; Gat 1989; 
Keegan  1993). For Clausewitz, the legislature retains control of the military, 
while the executive branch functions as the legislature’s day-to-day managers of 
the military.
Until fairly recently, intelligence services in many democracies were merely 
provided by specialists housed within traditional institutions; the military, for 
example, would have a division specialising in intelligence. But steadily over the 
course of the twentieth century, intelligence services developed into independent 
institutions, such as MI5, MI6 and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Who 
would own these bodies? On the one hand, political ownership by the legislature 
has been actively opposed: a major reason for this is lawmakers’ lack of discretion 
and their inability to keep their mouths shut. On the other hand, many democrats 
say that giving the intelligence services to the executive branch would unfairly 
empower them, lead to domestic partisan abuse, and lead the executives into all 
sorts of foreign mischief.
By the end of the twentieth century, the debate seems to have been settled: intelligence 
is said to be an “executive function” or intelligence services exist principally to “serve 
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the needs of the executive authority”.11 Executive branches have evolved to the point 
where they think it imprudent to keep every inch of this power to themselves; they 
share some – only some – of it with the legislature. The US Congress, for example, 
has not been understood to be entitled to intelligence; it receives what the executive 
branch thinks is “appropriate”.12 In the UK, it was customary practice not even to 
officially or publicly admit to the existence of the intelligence services, although this 
has changed and intelligence-sharing with the Houses of Commons and Lords has 
now been established.
In other words, the SOP no longer divides power in a way that encourages 
institutional competition. The executive branch takes the lion’s share. In addition to 
its already substantial powers over the armed forces, it has now added the power to 
accumulate foreknowledge of war.
An instrument of the people
How can a legislature help prevent the state making war on people? For a start, the 
legislature has to hold genuine power over the armed forces, especially the power to 
declare war and spend money. In using these powers, the lawmakers will not turn 
on the people because, so the argument goes, the legislature consists of the people’s 
representatives. But these representatives inevitably have to decide, and when they 
do, majorities and minorities are produced. So the state may still make war on 
citizens, albeit a minority of citizens. Legislative majorities can indeed be tyrannical: 
outvoted citizens are at risk of being spied upon, intimidated, persecuted, and killed.
One way of counteracting majority tyranny is judicial review. This option is 
available, provided that the country is a constitutional democracy. Another way is 
to hope that the majority takes an enlightened view of their own interests. Political 
majorities are rarely permanent and the fear that you will be paid back with interest 
is usually reason enough for self-restraint. But in some situations, such as the Roman 
Catholic voters of Northern Ireland, the outvoted are a permanent minority.
Legislatures in general fare poorly in their efforts to control the resort to force. 
“Presidentialism” creeps in (Linz 1990) and tends to erode the workings of a 
multiparty democratic imperative, the legislature and perhaps, in some cases, 
the desired democratic control over armed forces that could well marginalise the 
military as an instrument of the people.
11 One of the most important conclusions of the 9/11 Commission in the US was to confirm the 
principle of intelligence services as an “executive function”. See Chapter 13 of the final report 
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 2007).
12 In 1992 the National Security Act (1947) was revised to include, among the duties of the Director 
of Central Intelligence (DCI), the obligation to provide intelligence “where appropriate, to 
the Senate and House of Representatives and the committees thereof ”. What is appropriate, 
however, is for the DCI to decide.
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A civilianised – not standing – military
Democratic thinkers have an acute dislike and suspicion of large standing militaries. 
In The Government of Poland, Rousseau observes:
Regular armies have been the scourge and ruin of Europe. They are good 
for only two things: attacking and conquering neighbors, and fettering and 
enslaving citizens … .
and
[Professional soldiers should never] ever be charged with any sort of policing 
of citizens … Even the mildest police function you might entrust to them 
would result in acts of violence, irritations and abuses on a tremendous scale; 
in due course your soldiers and citizens would become enemies – a misfortune 
that accompanies regular troops everywhere … . (Rousseau 1985:80-82)
If the absence of a regular army were to lead to a sudden invasion, Rousseau says, 
this would undoubtedly be a calamity but “permanent chains are a far greater 
[calamity]” (Rousseau 1985:86).
Most democratic thinkers prefer a militia, a collection of armed citizens, usually 
only assembled in times of danger, as opposed to a permanently available body of 
(career) soldiers. Arguments about the citizen-soldier are consistent: the rights 
enjoyed by citizens require a complement of duties, including those of helping with 
defence; participating in defence inculcates appropriate democratic values, such as 
discipline and fraternity; because a militia exists only as need arises, governments are 
not tempted by the availability of an armed body; and defence by citizens is likely to 
show more courage and commitment because citizens defend their families, friends, 
and their home (Machiavelli  1950:44-55,  226-227; Rousseau  1985:81). The 
American Constitution illustrates the response to the threat posed by a standing 
army: arm the citizens so that they can fight back (United States of America 1789; 
see also De Tocqueville 1969:168-169; The Federalist Papers 1961:67-71).
In contemporary circumstances, however, most democratic scholars concede that 
a standing military is necessary, but then add that these soldiers need to be good 
soldiers but simultaneously be able to resist being used to fight fellow-citizens. How 
does one manage to have both obedience and democratic sensibilities in a soldier?
One path lies in educating and socialising the officer corps in the behaviour, ideas, 
relations, etc. that a democracy requires of its armed forces. The ideal outcome 
of the education/socialisation process is for the soldiers to exercise self-control: 
the soldiers themselves want to do certain things and refrain from others. The 
self-control ideal can be achieved by, for example, having civilians teach in military 
academies and schools and during training (Sarkesian, Williams & Bryant, 1995) 
and by professional penalties and rewards that tell the officers what roles to play. 
Critics of the educational/socialisation path claim that the efforts to inculcate the 
right values in career soldiers will be flawed or insufficient; sooner or later, they say, 
the soldier learns that his career will be unfulfilled without a war – and any war, even 
one against fellow-citizens, will do.
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A second path lies in manipulating the social composition of the military: the 
military needs to include enough soldiers whose civilian-social origins discourage 
authoritarianism. The right mix of people is pursued through, among others, 
national service and recruitment practices. National service is often sold on 
the grounds that it is good for the servicemen and –women. It inculcates values 
useful to individuals, such as discipline, or it makes a national contribution by 
maintaining key ingredients of citizenship. But the presence of national servicemen 
in the military is also a useful counterbalance to career soldiers. How so? National 
servicemen come from a civilian world and their unmilitary relations, habits and 
values are carried into a world where hierarchy and obedience are the usual trump 
cards. De Tocqueville remarks:
They perform their duties as soldiers, but their minds are still on the interests 
and hopes which filled them in civilian life. They are therefore not colored by 
the military spirit but rather carry their civilian frame of mind with them into 
the army and never lose it. (De Tocqueville 1969:652)
Democrats are reassured when they see that a military is composed of people with 
familial and social ties to the citizenry; surely, the reasoning goes, brother will not 
fight brother. Securing civilian influence ensures that the military is not a dangerous 
“little nation apart” (De Tocqueville 1969:648). Probably the best example here is 
France. French soldiers and theorists have long defended the levee en masse ordered 
by the Revolution in 1792. The persistence of compulsory military service over the 
last two centuries partly explains why the French military, rather than developing 
separateness, has been a mirror of economy, society and politics (De la Gorce 1963; 
Horne 1984).
The fear that soldiers will make war on government
The military’s coup-making ability or their praetorianism is usually seen as “the central 
challenge, of civil-military relations” (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster 2005:2). This 
centrality is for very good reasons. In Central and South America, praetorianism is 
ubiquitous (Collier 1979; O’Donnell, Schmitter & Whitehead 1986; Stepan 1988). 
African militaries, especially in West Africa, are notorious for their coup-making 
taste, which derives from their corporate self-interest rather than devotion to their 
country’s modernisation. Middle Eastern militaries are not far behind. Even in 
Western Europe, Greece, Portugal and Spain have seen long periods of military rule, 
not to speak of the several French coup-attempts in the twentieth century alone 
(Perlmutter 1977; 1980).
Why do so many militaries do this? Democrats usually argue that it is not due to 
personality, although an authoritarian personality certainly will help. One reason 
is that the military necessarily has a hierarchical mindset and organisation, which 
can easily slide into contempt for civilians and their representatives. Another reason 
is that, having chosen a career of specialising in violence, a soldier must be deeply 
disappointed with a professional life without a war. If soldiers are true to themselves, 
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in other words, there is a natural tension with civilian government. Even democratic 
armies have a “restlessness of spirit”:
… all the ambitious minds in a democratic army ardently long for war, because 
war makes vacancies available … honors within the reach of all, causes soldiers 
to dream of battlefields. (De Tocqueville 1969:647)
Today’s Praetorianism, understood as the armed forces’ domination of political and 
other societal realms and not just the literal replacement of civilian rulers, is not 
confined to the military. Intelligence services also have a well-deserved reputation 
for manipulating policy and politics, including in established democracies.
How do democrats act on the fear of praetorianism? I mention only four avenues 
of actions: external orientation, representative state control, non-partisanship 
and professionalism.
External orientation
Until roughly the nineteenth century, most countries saw the military used 
domestically, as a type of police force. This orientation became increasingly 
unacceptable as democratic development accelerated during the nineteenth century. 
The new ideal was to give the soldier no cause to develop political interests, asking 
certain political questions, for example, “How well is the incumbent doing?” or 
“Is government as efficient as it should be?” The new ideal was made practical by 
externalising the military: the military fought the militaries of a foreign country. 
The soldiers’ eyes were thus redirected to what might arrive from across the border, 
and the soldiers were given space to develop an attitude of indifference to the 
political process in their own country.
Representative state control
This set of action is comparable to Huntington’s subjective dimension. Both 
executive and legislature are given powers to maintain their power over armed forces 
(Huntington 1957, especially pages 80-83), and they are entitled to do so because 
of their electoral base of representivity. The civilian state is superior not because 
it is civilian but because its power rests on genuine elections or other devices of 
representation (Fayemi & Ball 2004:Chapter 3). The purpose of the civilian state’s 
powers is to find evidence of disobedience and, worse, plotting.
Legislatures (for example) have powers of oversight, that is, the right to ask 
questions, and powers of accountability, meaning the lawmakers can penalise, 
forbid, or sanction actions. Money is an important tool for the legislature. Armed 
forces are obliged to spend money as instructed by the legislature; if the lawmakers 
do not like what they see, they simply take the money away.13
13 In the context of the fear of soldiers replacing elected civilians, oversight and accountability 
function to discover praetorian conspiracies in the armed forces. The purpose of oversight 
and accountability in the context of the fear of government making war on the people is to 
counteract the power of elected civilians and the armed forces they have at their disposal. 
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Civilian control can never be presumed to be entrenched, regardless of whether 
the sky is darkened with constitutions and laws. Power struggles of some sort 
are always in motion. And it is sobering to see how many attempts at regaining 
or strengthening civilian control are ineffective or counterproductive. In the early 
1970s, for example, the Church Commission revealed details about American 
covert actions in Chile and elsewhere, some hilarious but others striking in their 
mindless venality. Congress imposed stricter control over the intelligence agencies, 
for example, the Clarke Amendment banning all covert aid related to Angola. 
Less than a decade later, it was obvious that these measures had resulted in driving 
the intelligence agencies deeper underground. The Tower Commission Report 
of 1987 revealed arms transfers to Iran, support for the Contras of Nicaragua, etc. 
(Draper 1991). Because the legislative financial backing was suspended, the armed 
forces simply retreated deeper into the shadows and sought money by illegal means, 
while the National Security Council’s staff filled vacuums created by Congressional 
prohibitions applied to the CIA. The intelligence agencies had become more 
secretive and less accountable than they had been before Congress acted so assertively 
(see Persico 1990; Tower Commission Report 1987; Woodward 1987). Certainly 
during the Reagan Administration, armed forces dominated American foreign 
policymaking about Central American and Southern Africa (see Crocker 1992).
Opportunities and power of representative state control are just that; they are no 
guarantee of success. In established democracies, as we saw above, lawmakers’ efforts 
to assert themselves may be counterproductive, maladroit and superficial. Certainly 
the new democracies have their work cut out for them: their efforts to expose bad 
soldiers and spies may well leave them very dead indeed.14 Yet there is no alternative: 
if bad soldiers and spies are to be exposed, high risk political battles need to be 
fought repeatedly and skilfully.
Non-partisanship
Civilians under pressure may well dream of prohibiting political thinking in 
the minds of members of the armed forces but abolishing politics is, of course, 
impossible. However, one can get quite far by making punishable any display of 
partisan loyalties. Soldiers and spies’ political views are defined as private business 
severed from professional lives. They should not lend their services to a political 
party or group or manipulate the political process to their own ends. If members of 
armed forces do so, their careers must suffer. Looking at the problem from a different 
angle, opposition politicians must not seek sympathetic ears in the military.
Professionalism
As noted above, Huntington saw that the political subordination of the military 
is, to a large extent, a matter of self-control. Soldiers seek to be professional rather 
than political; they want political neutrality or do not want to govern the political 
14 Guatamala’s recent history is a graphic illustration of how the soldiers can strike back at civilians. 
See Goldman (2007) and Schirmer (1998).
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realm (Huntington 1957:80-97).15 The mechanisms by which professionalism is 
produced are very similar to those producing a civilianised military: education/
socialisation and manipulating the social composition of the officer corps.
Although perhaps once a single vision about improving the quality of strictly 
military action, professionalism today varies according to context. The French have 
fought over professionalism for centuries. French officers and civilian leaders have 
very few values in common, with the soldiers usually taking up extreme positions 
on the right, while many politicians are inclined to leftist beliefs and opinions. 
Among Latin American security forces professionalism extends traditional roles so 
that a soldier has legitimate duties other than war, including a duty to ferret out 
domestic enemies of the state. Latin security forces have been encouraged to believe 
such role extension is legitimate, among others by national security doctrines 
and training in such places as the School for the Americas (Shafer  1988). No 
specialist of Latin politics has doubted that national security is the major culprit 
in sustaining praetorian habits (Enselaco 1995; Pion-Berlin 1989; Stepan 1988). 
This praetorianism is not temporary intervention to accomplish limited goals; it is 
structural intervention, which creates for the coercive forces permanent roles at the 
centre of the economy, politics and society (Barros & Coelho 1981).
Conclusion
The three fears about armed forces have been matched with how the democratic 
tradition has addressed those fears. In my discussion, fears and means and methods 
are not idealised but presented as they have happened or in actual behaviour; that 
is, warts and all.
The result is a framework that can be applied to study civil-coercive relations 
behaviour in old as much as new democracies, as well as to democracies in times of 
peace and war.16 And it applies when democracy is associated with freedom, with 
transformation, or, as most contemporary theorists and southern Africans would 
argue, when it means the absence of war.
The first fear is of a warlike culture and society. The traditional democratic cure 
for this condition has been commerce, either by arguing that the acquisitive drive 
was natural or by noting that some historical conditions, notably Protestantism, 
produced the acquisitive drive.
The second fear is of state power, of which the armed forces form part. When 
state power is concentrated, a large standing army is available, and legislatures are 
powerless. The fear is that politicians and armed forces will spy on their own people, 
arrest and detain them in preparation of the killing, and then kill them.
15 Huntington refers to the self-control as the objective dimension of civilian control over 
the military.
16 For a contrary view, see Cohen (2003:271).
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And finally, out of a third fear of soldiers replacing elected and representative 
government, democrats have punished partisanship while externalising the 
military function, strengthening representative state control and relying on armed 
forces’ professionalism.
It remains now to illustrate in greater detail especially how the new democracies of 
the last few decades have acted on each of these fears. The framework is thus not 
another set of ‘oughts’; its real test is in whether the fears do exist and how these are 
addressed in actual behaviour.17
17 See my longer Democratic civil-coercive relations: A framework for analysis (forthcoming).
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